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Abstract 
Using a unique micro dataset and advanced panel models, this study examines the effects of 
demand shocks on grocery retail price for avocados, a key Californian fresh produce commodity. 
Retail prices for avocados exhibited countercyclical movements over seasonal demand shocks 
for avocados associated with some holidays and events. Demand for avocados is shown to be 
higher during some holidays/events, e.g., Christmas/New Year, Super Bowl Sunday, and Cinco 
de Mayo. Super Bowl Sunday and Cinco de Mayo are identified as holidays/events associated 
with idiosyncratic demand peaks for avocados, but not associated with high aggregate consumer 
demand.  Retail  price  and  margin  were  significantly  lower  during  some  holidays/events 
associated with high demand for avocados, e.g., Christmas/New Year, Super Bowl Sunday, and 
Cinco de Mayo. The study also shows that the increase in demand and decrease in retail price 
during holidays/events with demand peaks for avocados was present for both large and small 
sizes of avocados, and the size of demand increases and the size of price reductions were not 
statistically different between large and small size of avocados. Furthermore, shipping price did 
not change or increased slightly, and hence moved opposite from retail the price during most 
holidays/events with high demand for avocados.  
We  examine  and  test  the  predictions  by  four  classes  of  theories  that  put  forward  to 
explaining countercyclical price movements over demand peaks. Overall, the evidence provides 
support for the Lal and Matutes (1994) model that retailers reduce retail prices and/or margins 
during a commodity’s high-demand periods, but does not support alternative explanations for 
countercyclical price movements, such as Bernheim and Whinston (1990), Warner and Barskey 
(1995),  or  Nevo  and  Hatzitaskos  (2006).  The  findings  are  consistent  with  the  findings  by 
Chevalier, Kashyap, and Rossi (2003).    2 
The study estimates the effects of the CAC’s promotion programs on retail sales, retail 
price,  and  shipping  price  at  disaggregate  level.  The  analysis  demonstrates  that  the  CAC’s 
promotion programs were associated with positive retail sales. In particular, the evidence from 
the  long-panel  data  suggests  that  the  CAC’s  promotion  programs  were  successful  in  raising 
avocado  sales.  There  is  no  evidence  that  retailers  charged  higher  prices  during  the  CAC’s 
promotions. 
 
Keywords:  retail  price,  retail  price  determination,  countercyclical  price  movement,  dynamic 
panel model, GMM.    3 
 
1  Introduction  
There  is  a  growing  body  of  evidence  that  retail  prices  fall  in  periods  of  high  demand,  e.g., 
Warner  and  Barsky  (1995),  MacDonald  (2000),  Chevalier,  Kashyap,  and  Rossi  (2003),  and 
Hosken and Reiffen (2004), a result inconsistent with a model of perfect competition, or with 
standard  models  of  oligopoly,  such  as  the  Bertrand  or  Cournot  model.  This  leads  to  a 
fundamental question about pricing behavior at retail. That is, how and to what extent variations 
in retail prices are related to changes in underlying cost and demand factors, and are explained 
by retailers’ strategic behavior?  
Using a unique micro dataset and employing advanced panel models, this study examines 
retailer pricing behavior for avocados, a key California specialty commodity. How retail prices 
respond to seasonal demand shocks is of particular interest of this study. We examine seasonality 
of avocado demand and retailer pricing behavior for avocados during peaks of avocado demand. 
Demand  for  avocados  peaks  during  some  holidays/events,  e.g.,  Christmas/New  Year,  Super 
Bowl Sunday, and Cinco de Mayo, according to the CAC. We examine how retail price for 
avocados changes during holidays/events associated with high demand for avocados. It has been 
found in the literature that retail prices are low during demand peaks. We examine four classes of 
theories that provide explanations for the countercyclical price movement over demand peaks. 
Next,  we  assess  how  shipping  price  changes  during  holidays/events  with  high  demand  for 
avocados, and whether shipping price moves differently from retail price. Finally, how retailers 
set price in response to demand shocks is important in the context of agricultural industries’ 
efforts to promote and market their products. We evaluate the promotional effects of the CAC’s 
advertising programs on retail sales, retail price, and shipping price. Holidays/events may be   4 
referred to simply as “holidays” in the following discussion, e.g., holiday dummies and holiday 
effects.  
The  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  The  next  section  reviews  theories  that  explain 
countercyclical price movement during periods of peak demand, and empirical findings. Section 
3 describes the data, and section 4 presents the empirical models including a retail pricing model, 
a shipping price model, and a retail sales model. Hypothesis tests are discussed in section 5. The 
econometric model, model specification tests, and model selection are presented in section 6. 
Section 7 presents the results, and the last section concludes.  
2  Literature Review 
Empirical studies, such as Warner and Barsky (1995), MacDonald (2000), Chevalier, Kashyap, 
and Rossi (2003), and Hosken and Reiffen (2004), have found that retail prices fall in periods of 
high  demand.  These  findings  are  not  consistent  with  the  models  of  perfect  competition  or 
standard oligopoly (e.g., Cournot or Bertrand), which predict that firms either do not change or 
raise prices given a positive demand shock. 
Lal and Matutes (1994) and Hosken and Reiffen (2004) predict that retailers are likely to 
put “popular” products that have higher demand on sale, in order to compete for consumers’ 
store patronage. Therefore, the model implies that a product is more likely to be on sale during 
periods of its peak demand.  
Warner and Barsky (1995) explain the countercyclical price movement as the result of 
economies  of  scale  in  consumer  search.  Consumers  engage  in  more  searching  and  traveling 
between stores during peak demand periods, such as Thanksgiving and Christmas holidays, than 
at the other times. Consumers’ demands, thus, are more price elastic when the overall demand is 
high. Consequently, retailers lower prices when the overall demand is high.   5 
Firms may engage in tacit collusion in a repeated game. Under a tacit collusion model 
with several firms selling a single product, Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) argue that the price 
collusion among firms could break down, and the price could fall during a temporary demand 
peak. This is because the benefit of cheating, i.e., benefit from the increased demand in the 
current  period,  outweighs  the  cost  of  being  punished  for  defection.  Bernheim  and  Whinston 
(1990) extend Rotemberg and Saloner’s model to multi-product firms, and suggest that margins 
may be lower when aggregate seasonal demand is high, however tacit collusion should not be 
broken  down  and  margins  should  not  be  lowered  when  idiosyncratic  demands  of  individual 
products are high, holding aggregate demand fixed. The prediction by Bernheim and Whinston is 
observationally similar to the prediction by Warner and Barsky. 
One distinction between the explanations by Lal and Matutes, and by Warner and Barsky 
and  Bernheim  and  Whinston  is  that  both  Warner  and  Barsky,  and  Bernheim  and  Whinston 
predict that, holding other factors constant, retail prices fall during the aggregate demand peaks, 
but not during the idiosyncratic demand peaks. However, according to Lal and Matutes, retailers 
are  more  likely  to  put  a  product  on  sale  during  its  high  demand  periods,  even  though  its 
idiosyncratic demand peaks do not coincide with the aggregate demand peaks. Secondly, Lal and 
Matutes suggest that retailers put a product on sale under its ordinary demand condition as long 
as it is among the list of the “popular” products. In contrast, neither Warner and Barsky nor 
Bernheim and Whinston offer an explanation for retailers’ frequent sales behavior. The models 
imply that retailers have no incentive to reduce retail prices or markups, when the aggregate 
consumer demand is not high.  
Chevalier, Kashyap, and Rossi (2003) analyze the countercyclical price movement over 
demand cycles by using retailer scanner data on twenty nine categories of grocery products sold   6 
at  100  stores  of  the  Dominick’s  Finer  Foods  retail  chain  in  the  Chicago  metropolitan  area 
between 1989 and 1996. They examine these three classes of theories, economies of scale in 
search (e.g., Warner and Barsky), tacit collusion (e.g., Bernheim and Whinston), and loss-leader 
models (e.g., Lal and Matutes). Their findings support the prediction by Lal and Matutes that 
retailers  compete  with  each  other  by  advertising  sales  for  products  with  high  demand,  and 
therefore, retail prices are lower during demand peaks.  
Nevo and Hatzitaskos (2006) use the same data as Chevalier, Kashyap, and Rossi to 
study  the  countercyclical  price  movement.  Chevalier,  Kashyap,  and  Rossi  analyze  weighted 
average price indices for aggregate products and aggregate product categories (e.g., tuna). The 
weights  used  to  construct  price  indices  are  the  dollar  shares  of  individual  UPC  codes  in  an 
aggregate product or product category. Nevo and Hatzitaskos point out that weighted average 
price indices could be lower during seasonal demand peaks because the sales shares of cheaper 
products within a product category increase when demand is high, even though retailers do not 
change retail prices for individual products. This could arise as consumers shift their demand 
from  quality  and  high-priced  goods  to  cheaper  ones  when  demand  for  a  generally-defined 
product category is high. 
Nevo and Hatzitaskos decompose the decrease in a weighted average price index into a 
substitution effect due to an increase in the share of cheaper products, and a price reduction 
effect due to direct decreases in retail prices of individual products. They find that for almost all 
the products they study the substitution effect explains a large part of the decrease, and price 
declines are associated with a change in demand elasticity and the relative demand for different 
brands. Their findings suggest that the prediction by Lal and Matutues does not explain price 
declines for the data they examine. Therefore, the countercyclical price movement over seasonal   7 
demand cycles is explained by consumers’ behavior instead of retailers’ tactic pricing behavior. 
Examining how retailers set price in response to positive demand shocks is important to 
evaluating  an  industry’s  promotion  programs.  Many  agricultural  industries  have  utilized 
industry-wide promotion programs funded by producer and/or handler assessments as a tool to 
increase sales and producer incomes. Various studies have shown that these programs are often 
quite successful in generating a high return on the dollars invested (Kaiser et al. 2005).  
However, little is known about how the effectiveness of these programs is facilitated or 
impeded by retailers’ own pricing strategies. Retailers, according to Warner and Barsky, and 
Bernheim and Whinston, do not reduce retail prices or markups during the idiosyncratic demand 
peaks generated by product-specific promotions. However, Lal and Matutes predict that retailers 
will conduct sales for a product if a promotion campaign can successfully increase its demand. 
On the other hand, if retailers respond to a commodity advertising campaign by raising prices to 
consumers to absorb any demand increase induced by the promotion, the higher sales that are 
needed to induce an increase in the producer price will not materialize. 
3  The Data 
A unique and comprehensive dataset was assembled through the cooperation of the California 
Avocado  Commission  (CAC)  and  its  marketing  agent—Fusion  Marketing.  The  specific  data 
sources include retailer scanner data on retail prices and sales for avocados, shipment data on 
market-specific shipping prices and shipment volumes for Californian and imported avocados, 
and industry promotion data on advertising plan and expenditure. Import arrival data on import 
volumes and prices for avocados to the U.S. were obtained from the U.S. International Trade 
Commission (USITC).  
Retailer scanner data were acquired from the Information Resources Inc. (IRI) by the   8 
CAC. Retailer scanner data contain weekly volume sales in units, dollar sales, and retail prices 
for different sizes and varieties of avocados for 90 major retail accounts across 38 retail markets 
in  26  states/regions  the  U.S.  A  “retail  account”  refers  to  a  particular  market-retail  chain 
combination, e.g., Safeway in San Francisco. This study focuses on large and small sizes of Hass 
avocados that are conventionally grown, which were carried by most of the retail accounts and 
accounted for over 90% of the total category sales in the data. Retailer scanner data are available 
from November 3, 1996 to October 31, 2004. A complete data series without missing values has 
418 weekly observations. 
The  CAC  provided  weekly  shipment  data,  including  shipping  prices  and  shipment 
volumes of Hass avocados from California to each of the 38 retail markets during November 3, 
1996 to October 31, 2004. These prices exceed the farm-gate prices by amounts that reflect 
shippers’ inventory and transactions costs and any margin that shippers are able to add, and 
provide a better reflection of what retailers in each destination market actually paid than do the 
farm-gate prices. Similar shipment data are available from the CAC for Chilean and Mexican 
avocados imported to the U.S. and shipped from various ports of entry to these 38 retail markets 
during  August  4,  2002  to  October  31,  2004.  The  ports  of  entry  are  not  identified,  but  the 
destination markets are.  
The  shipment  data  for  Mexican  and  Chilean  avocados  only  include  imports  that  are 
shipped by California handlers. According to the CAC, California handlers shipped over 70% of 
the total avocado imports to the U.S. Note that the shipments are  for  38 major markets  for 
avocados, but not for all destination markets. There are 65 shipping destination markets in total. 
These 38 markets account for over 90% of the market share for Californian avocados. shipments 
of Chilean and Mexican avocados to these 38 markets handled by California shippers accounted   9 
for 38.51% and 43.21% of the total Chilean and Mexican avocado imports during November 
2002 and October 2004. It indicates that these 38 markets represent a considerable fraction of the 
market for imported avocados. Shipping prices for Chilean and Mexican avocados handled by 
California  handlers,  in  any  case,  are  valid  to  represent  shipping  prices  for  all  Mexican  and 
Chilean avocados shipped to a retail market because California handlers managed the bulk of 
shipments, and the shipping market is mostly likely to be competitive.  
The data on monthly volumes, values, and prices of the total avocado imports and the 
imports from Chile and Mexico to the U.S. during 1996-2004 are obtained from the USITC. The 
import values are landed duty paid values, which include all costs incurred before and at the U.S. 
border and exceed the CIF values. Import prices in $/pound are calculated by dividing import 
volumes by landed duty paid values. The USITC data on avocado imports are not size specific. A 
caveat of the data is that the import data were for all varieties of avocados before July 2001 and 
were categorized into Hass and all other varieties after July 2001 inclusive. This study focuses on 
Hass  avocados,  and  therefore  the  import  volumes  and  prices  on  all  varieties  are  used  to 
approximate those for Hass avocados before July 2001. This is a reasonable approximation since 
Hass variety comprised most of avocado imports to the U.S., accounting for 93% of the total 
avocado imports during July 2001 and October 2004. 
The CAC provided access to information on media types, geographic locations, timing, 
and  expenditure  of  the  advertising  programs  conducted  by  the  CAC  during  2002-2004.  The 
media  types  of  the  CAC’s  promotion  programs  are  radio  advertising,  outdoor  displays,  and 
magazine  advertising.  The  CAC’s  advertising  programs  are  conducted  in  eleven  or  twelve 
selected  markets  during  late  January  or  February  to  July  each  year.  These  eleven  or  twelve 
markets were chosen for the CAC’s advertising programs for more than ten years.   10 
Two panel datasets are constructed to match different data according to the time periods 
that the data are  available. Econometric models may  be applied to both or either dataset as 
appropriate. A long-panel dataset includes the following data from November 3, 1996 to October 
31, 2004: (i) retailer scanner data including weekly retail prices and unit sales for large and small 
avocados in 90 retail accounts in 38 markets; (ii) the shipment data for Californian avocados 
including  weekly  shipping  prices  and  volumes  for  large  and  small  avocados  shipped  to  38 
markets;  and  (iii)  the  USITC  import  data  including  monthly  import  prices  and  volumes  for 
avocados of all sizes to the U.S.  
A short-panel dataset includes the following data from August 4, 2002 to October 31, 
2004:  (i)  the  retailer  scanner  data;  (ii)  the  shipment  data  for  Californian  avocados;  (iii)  the 
shipment data for Chilean and Mexican avocados including weekly shipping prices and volumes 
for large and small Chilean and Mexican avocados shipped to 38 markets; and (iv) promotion 
data including weekly advertising expenditure for each type of promotions and in each one of the 
nine promotion markets conducted by the CAC. There are 418 weeks and 118 weeks for the 
short- and long-panel data, respectively.  
4  The Models 
 
This study examines the effects of seasonal demand shocks, in particular holdaiys and events, on 
retail price, retail demand, and shipping price for avocados. The most popular uses for avocados 
include Guacamole, salads, and sandwiches. Avocado consumption is likely to be high where the 
Hispanic population is high and when the weather is warm. The CAC claims “party time is 
avocado time.” Avocado demand is expected to be high during national holidays, regional events, 
or whenever people celebrate as a group. Fourteen holidays and events are chosen that are either 
public  holidays  in  the  U.S.  or  are  identified  by  the  CAC  as  holidays  and  events  with  high   11 
avocado  sales.
 2,3 First,  we  examine  seasonality  of  avocado  demand  and  identify  important 
holidays and events with significantly high avocado demand in a retail sales model. Next we 
examine how retail prices change during holidays and events with high avocado demand in the 
retail pricing model. Third, we also assess the effects of holidays and events on shipping prices 
for avocados in a shipping price model, and whether retail prices and shipping prices move in 
different ways during holidays and events associated with high demand for avocados. Twelve 
dummy variables for holidays and events are included in the retail sales model, the retail pricing 
model, and the shipping price model to estimate the effects of holidays and events on retail sales, 
retail prices, and shipping prices, respectively. 
4.1  The retail pricing model 
A retail pricing model is estimated by both the short-panel and long-panel data. The following 
data are only available for the short-panel data: the data on the shipping prices for imported 
avocados are available after August 4, 2002, and data on industry advertising expenditure are 
available after 2002.  
The retail pricing model estimated using the short-panel data can be specified in the 
following linear form: 
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2  The  fourteen  holidays  and  events  include  Christmas/New  Year’s  Day,  Super  Bowl  Sunday,  Valentine's 
Day/Washington’s Birthday, Academy Awards, Easter, Cinco de Mayo, Mother’s Day, Memorial Day, Father’s Day, 
Independence Day, Labor Day, and Thanksgiving.  
3  It is reported by the CAC in 2004 that ten holidays and events produced about 42% of the total annual retail sales 
of avocados in the U.S., with Super Bowl Sunday and Cinco de Mayo each accounting for 10% of the annual retail 
sales  in  the  U.S.  Independence  Day,  Easter,  Valentine's  Day/Washington's  Birthday  and  Memorial  Day  each 
accounts for approximately 5% of the annual avocado retail sales in the U.S. Significant sales are also registered 
during New Year's Day, Mother's Day, Father's Day and Labor Day (www.avocado.org).    12 
where pa,s,t is the retail price in cents/unit at retail account a (e.g., Safeway in Los Angeles) for 
size s (s = {large, small}) in week t. The explanatory variables and parameters to be estimated 
are: 
―  α: The constant term.  
―  J t s a t s a p p − − , , 1 , , , ,L : Lagged retail prices from week t–1 to week t–J. 
―  2 , , 1 , , , , , , − − t s m t s m t s m w w w : The weighted average shipping price for avocados from all origins 
in cents/unit for size s avocados shipped to market m in week t, and lagged weighted 
average shipping prices in week t–1 and t–2.  
―  t m Ad , : The CAC’s advertising expenditure in thousand dollars in market m in week t.  
―  t α : Time-control variables, which are year-monthly dummies and dummy variables for 
holidays and events.  
―  s a, α : Individual effects, i.e., retail account-size individual effects, i.e., size s avocados 
sold at retail account a.  
―  J ρ ρ , , 1 L : Autoregressive coefficients. 
―  ϕ θ θ θ , , , 2 1 0 : Other parameters to be estimated.  
The  error  term,  εa,s,t,  is  specified  as  t s a , , ε ∼ ) , 0 ( Ω .  The  structure  of  the  variance-
covariance  matrix  Ω  may  encompass  heteroskedasticity,  serial  correlation,  and  correlations 
between unobserved factors in cross section.   
For the long-panel data, a different set of explanatory variables is used, and a linear retail 
pricing model can be written as follows:    13 
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The dependent variable, lagged retail prices, individual effects, and the disturbance term 
have the same interpretations as those in the model (1) for the short-panel data. The length of the 
lags of retail price may be different for the long-panel data. The explanatory variables that differ 







t s m w w w 2 , , 1 , , , , , , − − : The shipping price for size s Californian avocados shipped from 
California to destination market m in week t, and lagged shipping prices in week t–1 and 
t–2.  
―  T CH : The import volume of Chilean avocados in one million pounds to the U.S. in month 
T. Note that the variable will be canceled and cannot be included if weekly dummies or 
year-monthly dummies are used, because the import volumes are monthly observations.  
―  T m MEX , : The import volume of Mexican avocados in one million pounds to the U.S. in 
month  T.  Although  the  variable  has  a  subscript  m,  the  import  volume  of  Mexican 
avocados  is  not  market  specific.  The  subscript  m  merely  indicates  whether  Mexican 
avocado imports were allowed to enter market m in month T. 
―  t m AD . : A dummy variable for the CAC’s advertising programs, which equals one if an 
advertising program is conducted in market m in week t, and zero otherwise. 
The retail pricing model from equations (1) and (2) is a general presentation. The retail 
pricing model may have different forms, e.g., the model in first differences, depending on the 
estimation model that is used.   14 
4.2  The shipping price model 
A shipping price model is estimated to complement the analysis of retailer pricing behavior for 
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where superscript w on parameters and the error term denotes that they are in the shipping price 
model. For the short-panel data,  t s m w , , is the weighted average shipping price for avocados from 
all origins.  t s m ship , ,  denotes the total shipment volume of avocados from all origins in million 
units shipped to market m in week t.  T m MEX ,  denotes the import volume of Mexican avocados in 
one million pounds to the U.S. in month T. The variable of Mexican avocado imports has zero 
values  for  markets  that  did  not  allow  Mexican  avocado  imports.  t m Ad ,  denotes  the  CAC’s 
advertising expenditures in thousand dollars in market m in week t. Time-control variables are 
year-monthly dummies and holiday/event dummies. 
w
s α denotes a size dummy variable for small 
avocados, and 
w
m α denotes market individual effects.  
For the long-panel data, the shipping price model is estimated for the shipping price for 
Californian avocados, and the model has the same form as the model estimated by the short 
panel data. The only difference is a dummy variable for industry advertising program, t m AD . , is 
used. In particular, the advertising variable equals to one if an advertising program is conducted 
in market m in week t, and zero otherwise. 
4.3  The retail sales model   15 
 
A retail sales model is estimated to identify seasonal patterns of demand for avocados and the 
effectiveness of the CAC’s advertising programs in terms of promoting demand at the retail level. 






















+ + + = − L
,                                  4)  
where qa,s,t is the sales volume in thousand units for size s avocados at retail account a in week t. 
Retail sales are modeled as a function of contemporaneous and lagged retail prices, advertising 
expenditure,  individual  effects,  and  time-control  variables  including  dummy  variables  for 
holidays and events. Superscript d indicates that parameters and the errors are in the demand 
model. For the estimation using the short-panel data, the advertising expenditure in dollars spent 
each week in each promotion market is included as an explanatory variable. For the estimation 
using the long-panel data, a dummy variable for industry advertising program, t m AD . , is used. In 
particular, the advertising variable equals to one if an advertising program is conducted in market 
m in week t, and zero otherwise. 
5  Hypothesis Tests 
Marketing research conducted by the CAC suggests that avocado demand peaks during holidays 
and national events, such as Super Bowl Sunday, Cinco de Mayo, and Independence Day. As 
well, avocado demand is expected to be higher during summer months due to a higher incidence 
of parties, barbeques, etc. we particularly look at holidays and events that are associated with 
significantly high demand for avocados.  
Dummy variables for holidays and events in retail pricing model should primarily capture 
the effects of holidays and events on retailer pricing behavior, and essentially reflect how retail   16 
margins change during holidays and events when demand for avocados is high. First, avocado 
production and imports are seasonal, and demand for avocados is expected to be high during 
some holidays and events. Seasonality in supply and demand for avocados has influence on 
prices in the upstream market. The effects of demand and supply seasonality on prices in the 
upstream market can be controlled by shipping prices and/or volumes of imported avocados 
included in the retail pricing model. Second, we do not expect that other marginal retailing costs 
change  significantly  during  holidays  and  events.  Other  marginal  retailing  costs  are  usually 
pooled among thousands of products that retailers carry. Even if these marginal costs change 
during some holidays and events, they are likely to change when the aggregate retail demand is 
high (e.g., retail demand is high during Christmas and New Year’s Day season), but are unlikely 
to change when the idiosyncratic demand for avocados is high (e.g., demand for avocados is high 
in the week of Super Bowl Sunday). Therefore, the effects of holidays and events on retail prices 
should effectively reflect their influence on retail margins. 
After controlling for the effects of holidays and events on shipping prices, demand shocks 
during  holidays  and  events  are  expected  to  have  no  significant  effects  on  retail  prices  and 
margins under perfect competition. If retail prices and margins increase when seasonal demand 
for avocados is high, it conforms with the prediction of a standard model on oligopoly power.
4 
That is, retailers set retail prices above the perfect competitive level during demand peaks and 
sales volume is reduced relative to what would be sold under the perfectly competitive pricing. 
This behavior is detrimental to producers’ welfare. 
                                                 
4 Retailers face perfectly elastic demand under perfect competition. We expect that demand shocks only have effects 
on prices at the aggregate level, i.e., shipping prices, under perfect competition. After controlling the effect of 
demand shocks on shipping prices, holidays and events should have not have positive significant effects on retail 
prices. Moreover, the retail margin is constructed as the difference between retail price and shipping price. By 
subtracting shipping prices from retail prices, it subtracts the increase in retail prices due to increase in shipping 
prices during peak demand season. Hence, holidays and events should not have positive significant effect on the 
retail margin under perfect competition.   17 
On the other hand, empirical studies such as Chevalier, Kashyap, and Rossi (2003) and 
Hosken  and  Reiffen  (2004),  have  found  retail  prices  are  significantly  lower  during  seasonal 
demand peaks for grocery retail products. Chevalier, Kashyap, and Rossi (2003) examine three 
classes  of  theories  that  offer  different  explanations  for  countercyclical  price  movement.  See 
Chevalier, Kashyap, and Rossi (2003) and section 2 for a literature review. According to a model 
of economies of scale in search by Warner and Barsky (1995) and a tacit collusion model by 
Bernheim and Whinston (1990), retail prices and margins are lower when the aggregate demand 
is higher, such as during Thanksgiving and Christmas/New Year holidays; but retail prices and 
margins do not decrease when the idiosyncratic demand for avocados is higher, such as during 
Super Bowl Sunday and Cinco de Mayo. However, according to a loss-leader model by Lal and 
Matutes (1994), retailers could use avocados as a sales item to attract consumers into the store 
when avocados are popular in some season. Therefore retail prices and markups for avocados 
could be lower during idiosyncratic demand peaks for avocados.  
Nevo and Hatzitaskos (2006) point out that retail prices for a generally defined product 
category could be lower during seasonal demand peaks, because consumers shift their demand 
from quality and high priced products to cheaper products when demand for a generally-defined 
product category is high. Therefore, the countercyclical price movement over seasonal demand 
cycles is explained by consumers’ behavior instead of retailers’ tactic pricing behavior.  
To  test  whether  Nevo  and  Hatzitaskos’  explanation  is  relevant  for  retail  prices  for 
avocados, we examine how retail prices for small and large avocados change during seasonal 
demand peaks. Small and large avocados are regarded as nearly homogenous products. However, 
large avocados are more expensive than small avocados according to shipping price in $/pound. 
For  example,  shipping  price  for  large  avocados  was  14  cents  per  pound  higher  than  small   18 
avocados for avocados from all origins, and shipping price for large avocados was 22 cents per 
pound higher than small avocados for Californian avocados. In the retail sales model, we will 
also test whether demands for large and small avocados are significantly different.  
This may occur because small avocados require more preparation and have less uniform 
texture compared with large avocados, and therefore may be considered having lower quality 
relative to large avocados. Following Nevo and Hatzitaskos’ argument, the difference in retail 
prices due to difference in quality may amplify when demand is high, and consumers substitute 
away from high-priced items with cheaper ones. If Nevo and Hatzitaskos’ explanation is relevant, 
we should observe the weighted average retail prices for an aggregate size avocados decrease, 
but retail prices for large and small avocados should not decrease during seasonal demand peaks. 
Otherwise,  it  suggests  the  countercyclical  price  movements  over  seasonal  demand  peaks  are 
mainly explained by retailers’ strategic pricing behavior. Nevo and Hatzitaskos find that from 
almost all the products they study, decreases in retail prices for a product category are largely 
explained by increases in the shares of cheaper products. 
Consider now the expected effects of the CAC’s promotions on retail prices and markups. 
If the promotions are successful, retail sales should rise, whereas unsuccessful promotions will 
have little impact on sales. A priori expectations for the impact of promotions on retail prices are 
less clear. Unsuccessful promotions should have little impact on retailer pricing behavior.  Lal 
and  Matutes’  model  implies  that  retail  prices  and  markups  should  fall  during  the  CAC’s 
promotion periods, given that the promotions are successful in increasing demand. In contrast, 
Warner and Barsky, and Bernheim and Whinston do not predict that retailers reduce retail prices 
or margins as a result of the increase in avocado demand generated by the CAC’s promotions. 
On the other hand, evidence of higher retail markups in response to CAC promotions supports a   19 
simple market power model of retail pricing, whereby retailers increase prices and margins to 
capture benefits from the demand expansion. Notably the behavior described in Lal and Matutes’ 
model reinforces the effect of the CAC promotions, while behavior described by the simple 
market power model mitigates their effectiveness.  
In  reality,  retailers  usually  arrange  advertised  sales  before  the  acknowledged  demand 
shocks. As commonly observed, store flyers that contain advertised sales are usually circulated a 
week before sales actually take place. For example, retailers learn from experience or perceive a 
higher consumption of avocados during certain periods or holidays. Retailers, according to Lal 
and Matutes, will lower retail prices and markups correspondingly. Two implicit conditions are 
that (i) retailers are well informed about the demand shock, and (ii) retailers perceive the demand 
shock is positive. A lack of response in retail pricing to the demand shocks generated by the 
CAC’s promotions does not necessarily imply that retailers behave competitively. It might be 
caused  by  lack  of  communication  between  the  industry  and  retailers  about  the  industry’s 
advertising campaigns and about the effectiveness of the advertising programs. 
6  The Econometric Model and Model Selection 
6.1  The Dynamic Panel Model, GMM, and Instrumental Variables 
The microeconomic panel dataset available for this study enables scrutiny of retailer pricing 
behavior at the micro level and application of advanced panel models. This section discusses 
econometric methods and tests that are employed to estimate the empirical models in this study. 
Although the main purpose is to obtain the estimates of the seasonal dummies, sound empirical 
and econometrics models are performed.   
A  major  complication  of  the  estimation  is  the  possibility  of  inconsistent  parameter 
estimation caused by endogenous variables. IVs are a standard way to deal with endogenous   20 
variables. Panel data usually provide a surfeit of IVs relative to cross-sectional data, because 
regressors in other time periods may be valid instruments for endogenous variables in the current 
period.  
Dynamics are introduced in all three empirical models. For example, Dynamics in the 
retail pricing model to capture lagged response in retail price to changes in explanatory variables 
and to measure state dependence in retail price on its past values. We test the existence of the 
dynamics  and  the  length  of  the  lags  in  the  presence  of  dynamics.  Exogeneity  assumptions 
conditional  on  individual  effects  are  based  on  the  correlation  between  regressors  and  the 
individual  time-varying  error  term,  and  permit  the  correlation  between  regressors  and 
unobserved individual effects. The correlation between an explanatory variable and individual 
effects  gives  rise  to  endogeneity  and  inconsistent  estimation.  This  is  a  prominent  issue  in 
estimating dynamic panel models, because lagged dependent variables are inevitably correlated 
individual effects. A natural way to deal with the endogeneity due to the correlation between 
regressors and individual effects is to expunge individual effects. Therefore, fixed effects models, 
i.e.,  the  within  model  and  the  first-differences  model,  are  employed  to  purge  unobserved 
individual effects.  
Mean differencing gives rise to bias because it utilizes past values of a variable. However, 
this bias diminishes as the time period for the panel data increases. This is convincing as the data 
utilized in this study have long panels. The within model does not require instruments for the 
transformed  lagged  dependent  variables  and  other  predetermined  variables,  given  the  bias  is 
insignificant.  This  leads  to  efficiency  gain.  The  FD  model  has  been  a  canonical  choice  and 
performs well in estimating dynamic panel models. Arellano and Bond (1991) demonstrate that 
estimation of the FD model by the GMM  exhibits the least bias and  variance in  estimating   21 
parameters of interest compared with the OLS and within estimations based upon Monte Carlo 
simulations 
Panel  data  permit  regressors  in  other  periods  to  be  potentially  valid  instruments  for 
endogenous regressors in the current period. This leads to an abundance of IVs, and hence an 
excess of moment conditions for estimation relative to the number of coefficients to be estimated. 
Further, the disturbance term in panel models is usually not i.i.d. These circumstances introduce 
the possibility of more efficient estimation by the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). The 
GMM was introduced by Hansen (1982), and since then the GMM has become increasingly 
popular and particularly attractive in estimating panel models.  
This study applies a hybrid estimator that combines the Anderson-Hsiao estimator and 
the Arellano-Bond estimator. First, the Anderson-Hsiao level or difference estimator uses one 
lagged variable as an instrument, i.e., uses 2 , − t a y  or  2 , − ∆ t a y  to instrument  1 , − ∆ t a y , and the model is 
estimated  by  the  base-case  GMM  (Anderson  and  Hsiao,  1982).  Second,  the  Arellano-Bond 
estimator uses more than one lag of a variable as instruments, and the model is estimated by the 
stacked GMM (Arellano and Bond,1991). The Arellano-Bond estimator uses lagged variables in 
levels as excluded instruments in the original presentation. Third, this study applies an estimator 
that uses more than one lag of a variable or multiple variables as excluded IVs, and estimates the 
model using a base-case GMM. The estimations will use lagged variables in levels as well as in 
FD as excluded IVs to compare which one performs better. The estimations will use lagged 
variables of the endogenous variable, and use lagged variables of the endogenous variable and 
other exogenous variables as excluded IV, respectively. Because both the short-panel and the 
long-panel data have relatively large number of time periods, the number of lags for excluded 
IVs will be tested. Nonetheless, We will also test whether the stacked GMM performs well for   22 
estimation by the short-panel data, but will restrict the number of variable in the stacked form in 
the IV matrix to one. The one-step stacked GMM is preferred to the two-step stacked GMM. 
In sum, econometric methods that will be employed to estimate empirical models include 
(i) the within estimation, (ii) the base-case one-step GMM estimation with robust standard errors 
for the FD model, (iii) the base-case two-step GMM with the Windmeijer corrected standard 
errors for the FD model (Windmeijer, 2005), and (iv) the one-step stacked GMM for estimation 
by the short-panel data. Standard errors and the estimated weighing matrix used in the second-
step  of  the  two-step  GMM  are  robust  to  heteroskedasticity  and  arbitrary  patterns  of 
autocorrelation within individuals. 
6.2  Model Specification Tests 
Model specification tests that are performed are pertinent to choosing between the OLS, the one-
step  GMM,  and  the  two-step  GMM  estimators.  The  IV  estimation  can  be  applied  to  obtain 
consistent estimation, if some explanatory variable is endogenous. The endogeneity due to the 
correlation  between  regressors  and  the  individual-specific  transitory  error  term,  t a, ε ,  is  the 
subject  matter,  whereas  the  endogeneity  due  to  the  correlation  between  regressors  and 
unobserved individual effects can be dealt with by fixed-effects models.  
If all regressors are exogenous, but some variables are treated endogenous and excluded 
from the IV set, the IV estimator is inevitably inefficient compared to the OLS estimator. The 
loss of efficiency can be substantial, especially when the instruments are weak (Cameron and 
Trivedi, 2005, p. 275; Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman, 2003). However, even if all regressors are 
exogenous, the two-step GMM still has the attraction of being more efficient than OLS if  t a, ε is 
not i.i.d., and is at least as efficient as the OLS if  t a, ε is i.i.d. (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005, p. 747, 
p. 753). If the error term is not i.i.d., the two-step GMM is more efficient than OLS because an   23 
optimal  GMM  can  be  applied  to  an  overidentified  model,  which  includes  all  regressors  and 
values  of  regressors  in  other  periods  as  additional  instruments.  The  first-step  estimation 
(inefficient but consistent) used to generate the residuals is an OLS rather than an IV estimation. 
The efficiency gain is analogous to that for cross-section data with heteroskedasticity (Cameron 
and Trivedi, 2005, p. 753). If all regressors are orthogonal to the errors, and the errors are i.i.d., 
the two-step GMM equals the one-step GMM, is the efficient GMM, and is equivalent to OLS. 
In this case, additional IVs, which are correctly excluded from the model by nature, do not need 
to be included in the IV set.  
Therefore, not only testing for endogeneity is important in determining between the OLS 
and  the  GMM  that  is  used  to  implement  the  IV  estimation,  but  also  is  testing  for 
heteroskedasticity. Given some regressor is endogenous, and if the errors are heteroskedastic, the 
two-step GMM is more efficient than the one-step GMM; and if errors are homoskedastic, the 
two-step GMM is no worse asymptotically than the one-step GMM estimator.  
Taken altogether, the existence of endogenous regressors ensures the choice of the IV by 
the one-step or two-step GMM is preferred to OLS. If the errors are heteroskedastic, the two-step 
GMM is more efficient than OLS in the presence of endogeneity, or the one-step GMM in the 
absence of endogeneity; if the errors are homoskedastic, the two-step GMM is no worse than 
OLS or the one-step GMM asymptotically. However, the efficiency gain of the two-step GMM 
comes with the cost of finite sample bias. If errors are heteroskedastic, the one-step GMM or 
OLS are less efficient, but still are consistent. For this reason, even if errors are heteroskedastic, 
the one-step GMM or the OLS estimation should be obtained as a robustness check. In this case, 
robust standard errors need to be applied to the one-step GMM or the OLS to ensure correct 
inference.    24 
IVs can be applied to attain consistent estimation if some regressor is endogenous. An IV 
is  valid  if  it  is  orthogonal  to  the  contemporaneous  error  term.  An  IV  is  irrelevant  if  it  is 
uncorrelated with the endogenous variable. If there are too few relevant instruments with respect 
to the number of parameters to be estimated, the model is underidentified. Therefore, both the 
validity and relevance of an IV are necessary for consistency (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005, p. 
100).  A  “good”  instrument  is  exogenous  to  the  error  term  and  highly  correlated  with  the 
endogenous variable. It is practically difficult to obtain an instrument that is highly correlated 
with the endogenous variable, but is also a correctly excluded variable in the model. This gives 
rise to weak instruments. If an IV is weakly correlated with the endogenous variable, it could 
lead  to  low  precision,  finite-sample  bias  and  even  challenge  asymptotic  property  of  the  IV 
estimation  (Cameron  and  Trivedi,  2005,  p.  107–108).  Diagnostic  tests  are  performed  to  test 
validity of IVs as well as to detect weak instruments.
5 Further, panel data allow variables in other 
periods to serve as instruments. The presence of serial correlation in the error term can render 
some lags of the variable to be invalid instruments. Arellano and Bond (1991) develop a Z test 
for autocorrelation in errors, in particular pertinent to the FD models. 
The overidentifying restriction tests are applied to assess whether IVs are exogenous. In 
particular, if errors are heteroskedastic or clustered, the Hansen J test statistic are applied to test 
the joint validity of the whole IV set and the C test (or difference-in-Hansen test) to test validity 
of a subset of IVs or endogeneity of a set of explanatory variables. If errors are homoskedastic, 
the Sargan test that is a special case of the Hansen J test is for testing validity of IVs, and 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests are for testing endogeneity of explanatory variables. Nevertheless, 
                                                 
5 Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman (2003, 2007) and Roodman (2006) provide excellent summary for the tests for the 
relevance of IVs and weak IVs, and discussions of practical issues regarding weak IVs. The tests for the relevance of 
IVs and weak IVs applied in this study are based on those summarized in Schaffer, and Stillman (2003, 2007). 
Cameron and Trivedi (2005, p. 103–112, p. 177, p. 751) also provides a thorough survey on diagnostic tests for 
relevance of IVs and estimation issues regarding weak IVs.    25 
tests  for  orthogonality  conditions  and  tests  for  endogeneity  are  closely  related.  Because 
heteroskedastic errors exist in empirical models in this study.  
6.3  A Summary on Model Selection 
This section discusses the selection of estimation models, and briefly summarizes the estimation 
results  for  each  empirical  model.  The  estimation  results  for  alternative  models  and  model 
specification tests are not presented in this paper, but are available upon request. First, the results 
suggest that the base-case GMM is preferred to the stacked GMM. The stacked GMM estimation 
performed poorly due to the proliferation of moment conditions when the number of time periods 
is large. Second, the test results suggest that heteroskedasticity is present in all empirical models. 
Therefore, robust standard errors are applied for the one-step GMM, and the two-step GMM may 
be more efficient than the one-step GMM in finite sample. The standard errors from the one-step 
GMM  estimation  are  cluster-robust,  i.e.,  standard  errors  are  robust  to  heteroskedasticity  and 
arbitrary  patterns  of  autocorrelation  within  in  each  individual  (each  cross-sectional  unit)  by 
clustering at the individual level. TH estimated weighting matrix in the second step of the two-
step GMM estimation is also cluster-robust. The standard errors are the Windmeijer corrected 
standard errors.  
The Hansen J tests and the C tests are the relevant tests for the validity of IVs when the 
errors are heteroskedastic and clustered. Various weak identification tests that are distributed as 
F or χ
2 are cluster-robust as well. Extra lags of one or more variables are introduced as the 
excluded instruments for the two-step GMM in the absence of the endogenous regressor(s), or 
for the IV estimation by either the one-step or two-step GMM in the presence of the endogenous 
regressor(s). The starting lag length of the excluded IVs is twelve. The preferred lag length of the 
excluded instruments is chosen based on the following criteria: (i) the robustness of the estimated   26 
coefficients and the size of the standard errors, (ii) the Hansen J tests and the Arellano-Bond 
autocorrelation tests for the correct model specification and/or exogeneity of the IVs, and (iii) the 
tests for the redundancy of extra instruments.  
The estimation results for the retail pricing model are consistent from the estimations by 
the short-panel and long-panel data. The FD model is preferred to the within model to examine 
the dynamics of retail price and the effects of shipping price. The estimates of strictly exogenous 
variables, e.g., holiday dummies, avocados imports, and promotions, remain consistent in the 
within model, and are examined by the within model. The estimation results from the preferred 
models for the retail pricing model are reported in table 1. The preferred models are: a within 
model with an AR(6) and one lag of shipping price estimated by the one-step GMM for both the 
estimations by the short-panel and long-panel data; and a FD model that is an IV estimation by 
the two-step GMM in which the lag one retail price is instrumented by lag 4-7 of retail price as 
excluded IVs for both estimations by the short-panel and long-panel data.  
The estimation results for the retail sales model suggest that there is no consumption 
habit for avocados on weekly basis, and retail price and its lags are orthogonal to the error term. 
Holiday effects and promotion effects are mainly examined by the within model. The within 
models yield consistent estimates for these variables, as well as for the retail price and its lags. 
The within and FD models performed equally well in estimating the price coefficients by the 
long-panel data. However, the FD model performed better than the within model in estimating 
price coefficients, since the IV estimation of the within model is relatively weak compared with 
the  IV  estimation  of  the  FD  model.  Table  2  presents  the  estimation  results  of  the  preferred 
models, which are: (i) a within model for the long-panel data by the two-step GMM, in which 
lags 3-12 of retail price are introduced as the excluded IVs to obtain Hansen J test, and to see   27 
whether the two-step GMM improves efficiency in the presence of heteroskedasticity; (ii) a FD 
model for the long-panel data estimated by the two-step GMM, in which lags 3-11 of retail price 
in FD are introduced as excluded IVs to improve estimation efficiency and to obtain the Hansen 
J test; (iii) a within model for the short-panel data estimated by the IV estimation and the one-
step GMM, in which the contemporaneous retail price is instrumented by lags 3-9 of retail price 
as excluded IVs; and (iv) a FD model for the short-panel data estimated by the two-step GMM, 
in which lags 3-8 of retail price are introduced to improve estimation efficiency. The estimated 
price elasticity of demand at means is also reported for each preferred model. The price elasticity 
ranges from -1.36 to -1.83, indicating that avocado demand at the level of the grocery chain is 
price elastic. 
Table 3 presents the estimation results for the preferred within and FD models for the 
shipping price model. The results of the overidentification test suggest that the set of explanatory 
variables are orthogonal to the error term and the estimates are consistent.  
7  The Effects of Holidays/Events on Retail Sales, Retail Price, and 
Shipping Price  
A variable may have different interpretations in the FD model and in the within model. For 
variables  that  are  monthly  or  change  little  over  weeks,  e.g.,  monthly  import  volumes  and 
promotion expenditures, they are dealt with differently in the FD model and in the within model. 
For dummy variables, e.g., holiday dummies, they are not transformed in either the FD or the 
within model, and their effects have different interpretations in the FD and the within models. 
This is generally applied to all empirical models, and is mainly discussed in the case of the retail 
pricing model as follows. First, holiday dummy variables are not transformed in the FD model or 
the within model, but have different meaning in these two models. Holiday effects on retail price   28 
in mean differences are similar to holiday effects on retail price in levels. However, holiday 
dummies in the FD model measures the holiday effects on the change in retail price between two 
weeks. Holiday effects estimated from the FD model may not provide accurate evidence on 
whether retailers changed retail prices during holiday seasons for holidays that are close to each 
other (e.g., Christmas and New Year’s Day), or holidays that span two weeks of shopping time 
(e.g., for a holiday on Tuesday, both the weeks before and during the holiday are relevant). For 
example, if retailers reduced retail prices in both the week prior to and the week during a holiday, 
the change in retail price between these two weeks may not be significant, although the deviation 
of retail price from its average may be significant. One the other hand, for example, if retailers 
reduced retail prices for a holiday in a season associated with higher prices, e.g., Valentine’s Day 
and President’s Day, retail prices may not be significantly lower than its average, but retail prices 
may be significantly lower during the holiday week than in the previous week, or retail prices 
may be significant lower than the average prices in that season. For holidays that have one 
shopping week, e.g., Super Bowl Sunday, the estimates from the within and the FD model could 
yield consistent conclusion, although may not be the same. In sum, estimated holiday effects in 
the within and the FD models provide different information on how retail prices change during 
holidays associated with high avocado demand.  
Second, dummy variables and variables that do not change over weeks, e.g., yearly and 
monthly dummies, promotion variables, and variables of monthly avocado import volumes, are 
mainly examined by the within model. These variables are not transformed and mainly serve as 
control variables in the FD model. If monthly import volumes, for example, were transformed by 
first differencing, they would be only relevant to retail price in the first and last weeks in a month. 
Furthermore, the promotion variable in the within model is measured by promotion expenditure   29 
and is a continuous treatment variable in models estimated by the short-panel data, and is an 
indicator variable and a binary treatment variable in models estimated by the long-panel data. An 
advertising campaign lasted three weeks for the radio advertising and four weeks for the outdoor 
promotions, and the promotion expenditure did not change between weeks during an advertising 
campaign. A promotion variable in FD only measures changes in promotion expenditure the first 
and  last  weeks  of  an  advertising  campaign  and  changes  in  expenditure  between  consecutive 
campaigns. Instead, import volumes and promotion expenditure in levels are included in the FD 
model to control different shocks to changes in retail prices in different markets. The estimated 
coefficients of these variables in the FD model can provide meaningful information, although 
cautions should be taken when interpreting their effects. For example, suppose the increase in 
monthly  avocado  imports  is  associated  with  significant  decrease  in  retail  prices  in  mean 
differences, and hence in levels. However, the increase in monthly avocado imports may not 
have significantly negative effects on changes in retail prices between weeks within a month. 
7.1  Demand for Avocados during Holidays/Events 
The retail sales model includes twelve holiday dummies indicating fourteen holidays and events 
that are expected to have higher demand for avocados according to the CAC. Table 4 reports the 
estimated holiday effects on retail sales for avocados. A holiday dummy variable may represent 
more  than  one  holiday/event,  e.g.,  Christmas/New  Year,  and  may  indicate  more  than  one 
shopping week for a holiday/event depending on which day of the week the holiday/event falls 
in.
6 
Super  Bowl  Sunday,  Christmas/New  Year,  Cinco  de  Mayo,  Labor  Day,  and 
                                                 
6 If a holiday occurred on Monday, or Tuesday, or Wednesday, both the week before and the current week are 
considered as holiday weeks. If a holiday occurred after Wednesday, only the current week is considered as a 
holiday week. See section 6.1.2 for further discussion on modeling holiday effects.    30 
Independence Day
 are the top five holidays/events associated with significantly higher demand 
for  avocados,  as  suggested  by  the  estimates  from  the  within  models.  These  holidays/events, 
except Cinco de Mayo, had larger effects on avocado demand estimated by the short-panel data 
than their effects estimated by the long-panel data. This implies that these holidays/events might 
have stronger effects on avocado demand in recent years, although it has been “conventional” to 
consume avocados in these holidays/events. These five holidays/events are also identified as the 
holidays/events with peak demand for avocados by the estimates from the FD model. The FD 
model estimates the change in retail sales between two weeks, and is likely to underestimate the 
effect of Christmas/New Year that covers two to three shopping weeks.
7 There were on average 
17,590 (8,180) units more avocados for each size sold at a retail account in the week of Super 
Bowl Sunday; and there were on average 13,420 (12,330) units more avocados for each size sold 
at a retail account in the week of Super Bowl Sunday than in the previous week, estimated by the 
short-panel (long-panel) data.  
Easter and Memorial Day had significantly higher demand according to the estimates by 
the long-panel data, although the magnitude of the effects was small compared with the effects of 
the  top  five  holidays/events.  Easter  and  Memorial  Day  had  a  positive  but  not  statistically 
significant effect on retail sales at the 5% statistical significance level, according the estimates by 
the  short-panel  data.  Valentine/President’s  Day  are  identified  as  holidays/events  with 
significantly higher demand by the FD model, but not by the within model. This implies that 
demand for avocados during Valentine/President’s Day might be significantly high in a season 
with low demand for avocados (e.g., from January to April), but was not significantly higher 
                                                 
7 Holiday variables are dummy variables and are not differenced in either the within model or the FD model. A 
holiday dummy in the within model represents the deviation of retail sales from its individual means due to the 
holiday, whereas a holiday dummy in the FD model represents the change in retail sales between the current week 
and  the  previous  week.  See  section  9.1  for  a  discussion  on  dummy  variables  including  time-control  variables, 
holiday dummies, and promotion variables in the within and the FD models.   31 
compared with the year-around average demand for avocados. 
Academy  Awards,  Mothers’  Day,  Fathers’  Day,  and  Thanksgiving  did  not  have 
significantly  higher  demand  for  avocados.  These  holidays/events  except  Thanksgiving  are 
dropped in the retail pricing and shipping pricing models. Thanksgiving is regarded as a holiday 
for shopping, and hence is expected to be associated with a higher aggregate retail demand. 
Thanksgiving  is  retained  in  the  retail  pricing  and  shipping  pricing  models  to  examine  price 
movement when the aggregate retail demand is high. 
Table 4 also reports the estimated seasonality of retail sales for avocados from month to 
month.
8 October  is  the  base-line  month.  The  CAC  suggests  that  demand  for  avocados  is 
correlated  with  warm  weather.  As  expected,  demand  for  avocados  was  high  in  the  summer 
months May through September, with May and June having the highest demand, based on the 
estimates by the short-panel and the long-panel data.  
7.2  The Effects of Holidays/Events on Retail Price 
The effects of holidays/events on retail prices for avocados are expected to reflect the effects of 
holidays/events  on  retail  margin,  after  controlling  variation  in  shipping  price  during 
holidays/events, and assuming variation in unobserved cost factors has been controlled by year-
monthly dummies and individual effects, or has no significant change during holidays/events. If 
demand  shocks  during  some  holidays/events  have  effects  on  price  for  avocados,  they  are 
expected to have effects on shipping price which has been controlled in the retail pricing model. 
Under perfect competition, positive demand shocks are expected to have no significant effects on 
the retail margin. The movement of shipping price during holidays/events is examined in the 
next section to see whether retail price and shipping price move in the same direction during 
                                                 
8 The model is estimated by the year-monthly dummies. The year-monthly dummies are generated by the yearly 
dummies, monthly dummies, and their interacted terms. The estimates for the monthly dummies are reported.   32 
holidays/events.  
Holidays/events that have sizable and statistically significant effects are the focus of the 
analysis.  Year-monthly  dummies  cannot  control  shocks  of  unobserved  cost  factors  during 
holidays/events, although their effects are expected be small. A small and/or insignificant effect 
of a holiday/event on retail price may be due to the effect of unobserved cost factors during the 
holiday/event. See section 6.1.3 for a discussion of modeling cost factors in the retail pricing 
model and section 6.1.4 for a discussion of time-control variables in the retail pricing model.  
The retail pricing model estimated by the short-panel data uses the weighted average 
shipping price for Californian and imported avocados, and the retail pricing model estimated by 
the long-panel data uses the shipping price for Californian avocados. Therefore, the retail pricing 
model  by  the  short-panel  data  controls  variations  in  procurement  costs  better  than  the  retail 
pricing model estimated by the long-panel data. Therefore, We, in particular, examine the effects 
of  all  included  holidays/events  estimated  by  the  short-panel  data,  and  the  effects  of 
holidays/events during the peak season for Californian avocados  (e.g.,  May, June, and July) 
estimated by the long-panel data.  
Table  5  presents  the  estimated  effects  of  holidays/events  on  retail  price.  Some 
holidays/events evidently had significant effects on retail price for avocados. Among the top five 
holidays/events associated with significant higher demand for avocados, Christmas/New Year, 
Super Bowl Sunday, Cinco de Mayo, and Labor Day were associated with significant lower 
retail prices relative to the average price, and significant price reductions in the shopping week(s) 
during the holiday/event relative to the week prior to the shopping weeks of the holiday/event. 
Super  Bowl  Sunday  and  Cinco  de  Mayo  had  the  strongest  effect  on  retail  price  among  all 
holidays/events. During  Super Bowl Sunday, retail price was 18.83 cents/unit lower than its   33 
average level, and 25.86 cents/unit lower than the price in the previous week; during Cinco de 
Mayo, retail price was 15.52 cents/unit lower than its average level, and 14.10 cents/unit lower 
than the price in the previous week.  
Thanksgiving and Christmas/New Year are considered national holidays when people go 
out for shopping. Therefore, the aggregate demand is expected to be high during these holidays, 
as suggested by Warner and Barskey (1995) and Chevalier, Kashyap, and Rossi (2003). Retail 
sales  for  avocados  were  significantly  higher,  and  retail  price  for  avocados  was  significantly 
lower during Christmas/New Year. The effects of Thanksgiving on retail sales and retail price 
are insignificant in magnitude and/or by statistical significance. 
Independence Day was also associated with higher demand for avocados. The estimates, 
except the estimate from the within model by the short-panel data, suggest that Independence 
Day had no significant effect on retail price. Memorial Day and Valentine/President’s Day had 
no sizeable and/or statistically significant decrease in retail price relative to the average level. 
However, both Memorial Day and Valentine/President’s Day had significantly lower retail price 
compared  with  the  price  in  the  week  prior  to  the  holidays/events.  Retail  sales  were  slightly 
higher, and retail price was significantly higher during Easter.  
The results suggest that retail price and retail margin were significantly lower during 
holidays/events associated with high idiosyncratic demand for avocados, such as Super Bowl 
Sunday and Cinco de Mayo; retail price and retail margin were not significantly lower during 
holidays associated with high aggregate consumer demand, such as Thanksgiving; and retail 
price and retail margin were significantly lower during Christmas/New Year that is associated 
with  higher  aggregate  demand  and  higher  demand  for  avocados.  First,  the  results  are  not 
consistent with the predications by Warner and Barsky (1995) or Bernheim and Whinston (1990)   34 
that retail prices or retail markups fall during the periods with high aggregate consumer demand, 
but not during the periods with high idiosyncratic demand. Second, the estimation results present 
evidence  in  support  of  the  hypothesis  by  Lal  and  Matutes  (1994)  that  retail  prices  or  retail 
markups  are  lower,  ceteris  paribus,  during  high-demand  periods  for  avocados,  when  the 
aggregated consumer demand is not necessarily higher. 
Nevo and Hatzitaskos (2006) propose an alternative explanation for the countercyclical 
price  movement  of  differentiated  products  over  demand  peaks.  In  particular,  the  increase  in 
demand for a product category during some holidays/events is driven by the increase in demand 
for the cheaper product(s) within the product category. As a consequence the average price for 
the product category is lower during the holiday/event. Small and large avocados are regarded as 
nearly homogenous products. Nonetheless, retail demand for small avocados was lower than 
retail demand for large avocados (see section 10.1). Shipping price in $/pound is higher for large 
avocados than for small avocados (see section 9.1). This may suggest that small avocados may 
have lower quality than large avocados, since small avocados may require more preparation and 
have less uniform texture than large avocados. According to Nevo and Hatzitaskos’ theory, retail 
demand for small avocados is expected to be relatively higher than demand for large avocados 
during  holidays/events  associated  with  high  demand  for  avocados,  and  retail  price  or  retail 
margin is not expected to be lower for either size of avocados.  
The retail sales and retail prices in this study are for large and small avocados at the 
individual PLU code level. We examine whether the change in demand for small avocados is 
greater than the change in demand for large avocados during Christmas/New Year, Super Bowl 
Sunday, and Cinco de Mayo, and whether the change in the retail price for small avocados is 
smaller than the change in the retail price for large avocados during these three holidays/events.   35 
This is done by introducing dummy variables indicating large and small sizes to holiday dummy 
variables  for  these  three  holidays/events.  Then  We  test  whether  the  effects  of  these 
holidays/events on retail sales and retail prices are equal for large and small avocados.  
The evidence does not support the prediction by Nevo and Hatzitaskos. The results for 
retail sales and retail price for avocados are presented in table 4 and table 5, respectively. During 
Christmas/New Year, retail sales for small avocados were significantly higher than retail sales 
for  large  avocados  at  the  90%  significance  level  by  the  short-panel  data,  but  were  not 
significantly different from retail sales for large avocados by the long-panel data. Nevertheless, 
retailers  discounted  both  large  and  small  avocados  equally.  During  Super  Bowl  Sunday  and 
Cinco de Mayo, retail sales and retail price for avocados were not significantly different between 
large and small avocados.  
7.3  The Effects of Holidays/Events on Shipping Price 
The estimated effects of holidays/events on shipping price provide evidence on how shipping 
price changed, and whether the shipping price and the retail price moved in the same direction 
during holidays/events with high demand for avocados. Holiday dummies in the shipping price 
model capture both demand and supply shocks associated with those holidays/events. In contrast, 
holiday dummies in the retail pricing model measure the effects of holidays/events on retail price 
and  retail  margin  in  addition  to  the  effects  of  the  demand  and  supply  shocks  during  these 
holidays/events in the upstream market that have been controlled by shipping price. Therefore, a 
negative effect of a holiday/event associated with a high demand for avocados on the shipping 
price may indicate that the shipping price decreases, because supply adjustment dominates the 
demand shock during a holiday/event due to, for example, changes in supplies of Californian 
and/or imported avocados.    36 
A holiday/event is likely to have its effect, if any, on shipping price one or more weeks 
before the holiday/event takes place. Retailers make their procurement decision weeks before a 
holiday/event based on their expectations of the demand shock associated with the holiday/event. 
A  holiday  dummy  in  the  shipping  price  model  corresponds  to  a  single  week  which  the 
holiday/event is in. A lead variable is introduced for each holiday/event to indicate the week 
prior to the week which the holiday/event is in. One lead is preferred to more leads, since holiday 
dummies and their leads would overlap with each other if holidays/events are close to each other. 
Further, as suggested by the estimates from the retail pricing model, retail price is most likely to 
be influenced by the shipping price in the previous week. The dummy for Valentine/President’s 
Day  and  its  lead  follow  closely  with  the  dummy  for  Super  Bowl  Sunday  and  its  lead,  and 
therefore Valentine/President’s Day is dropped from the shipping price model.  
The effects of holidays/events are the effects on the weighted average shipping price for 
Californian and imports avocados estimated by the short-panel data, whereas they are the effects 
on the shipping price for Californian avocados estimated by the long-panel data. If the demand 
shock during a holiday/event is anticipated and its magnitude correctly forecast, and if grower-
shippers are able to arbitrage efficiently, then the shipping price before the holiday/event should 
not be significantly different from the shipping price in other periods.  
The results are presented in table 6. The effects of Super Bowl Sunday, Cinco de Mayo, 
and Christmas/New Year on shipping price are of particular interest. The results suggest that 
retail price moved in an opposite direction from shipping price during Christmas/New Year, 
Super Bowl Sunday, and Cinco de Mayo, and therefore retail margins were significantly lower 
during  these  holidays/events.  Super  Bowl  Sunday  had  no  significant  effect  on  the  weighted 
average shipping price or the shipping price for Californian avocados prior to the event, implying   37 
that grower-shippers were successful in intertemporal arbitrage, i.e., using supply response to 
“spread” the impact of the demand across multiple weeks. 
The shipping price in the week of Super Bowl Sunday decreased significantly from the 
shipping price in the previous week. This may be because retailers procured avocados prior to 
the event, and the demand for avocados at the shipping level plummeted in the week of the event. 
The weighted average shipping price was significantly higher before Christmas/New Year and 
Cinco de Mayo. The shipping price for Californian avocados was significantly higher in the 
week before Cinco de Mayo. 
The effects of some holidays/events on shipping price are statistically significant, but the 
size of holiday effects are small compared with the size of holiday effects on retail price. As 
mentioned,  year-monthly  dummies  and  holiday  dummies  in  the  shipping  price  model  are 
employed to capture unobserved cost as well as demand shocks. Therefore, the estimated effects 
of holidays/events on weekly shipping price may represent the effects of unobserved cost and/or 
demand shocks.  
A significant effect of a holiday/event on shipping price may suggest failure of efficient 
intertemporal arbitrage. Inefficient arbitrage may occur, because the magnitude of the shock was 
not anticipated, or the magnitude of competitors’ supply response was not correctly anticipated. 
This may  be true particularly  during seasons when multiple countries  are producing—Chile, 
Mexico, the U.S. (California).  In addition, there are impediments to arbitrage even if grower-
shippers correctly anticipate the shock and its magnitude. Those impediments may depend upon 
facets of growing, harvesting, and storing avocados. See sections 9.5 and 9.6 for discussions of 
arbitrage efficiency at the shipping level in the contexts of the effects of shipment volume, the 
CAC’s promotion programs, and Mexican avocado imports on shipping price for avocados.   38 
7.4  The  Effects  of  the  CAC’s  Promotion  Programs  on  Retail  Sales,  Retail  Price,  and 
Shipping Price 
Consumer advertising programs, such as media advertisements, have been widely utilized to 
increase demand for a product. If the promotions are successful, retail sales should rise. The 
findings on retail sales for avocados suggest that the CAC’s promotion programs had positive 
effects on retail sales for avocados. The promotion effects on retail sales estimated by the long-
panel data are statistically significant and higher than the promotion effects estimated by the 
short  panel  data,  which  are  positive  but  not  statistically  significant.  See  section  10.4  for  a 
discussion of the results on the effects of the CAC’s promotion programs on retail sales for 
avocados.  
In addition, if arbitrage at the shipping level was efficient between promotion and non-
promotion markets, and between promotion and non-promotion weeks or periods, the CAC’s 
promotion  programs  are  expected  to  have  no  significant  effects  on  shipping  prices  at  the 
destination market level. The farm price is expected to rise given the CAC’s promotion programs 
were successful in increasing demand for avocados. The results on shipping price for avocados 
indicate  that  both  spatial  and  intertemporal  arbitrage  was  efficient  in  response  to  shocks 
generated by the CAC’s promotion programs. See section 9.6 for discussions of the effects of the 
CAC’s promotion programs on shipping price for avocados and the implications for arbitrage 
efficiency. 
A priori expectations for the impact of promotions on retail price are less clear. Lal and 
Matutes’  model  (1994)  implies  that  retail  prices  or  markups  should  fall  during  the  CAC’s 
promotion periods, given that the promotions are successful in increasing demand. In contrast, 
Warner and Barsky’s model (1995) does not predict that retailers reduce retail prices or margins 
as a result of the increase in avocado demand generated by the CAC’s promotions. On the other   39 
hand, evidence of higher retail markups in response to the CAC’s promotions supports a simple 
market power model of retail pricing, whereby retailers increase prices and margins to capture 
benefits from the demand expansion. Notably the behavior described in Lal and Matutes’ model 
reinforces the effect of the CAC promotions, while behavior described by the simple market 
power model mitigates the effectiveness of the CAC’s promotion programs.  
If retailers did not retain the benefits of increase in demand for avocados due to the 
CAC’s promotion program, we expect that the benefit of the promotions passes on to the farm 
level, and as a result, farm price increases. Since arbitrage at the shipping level was efficient in 
response to demand shocks generated by the CAC’s promotions, the effect of demand expansion 
should transmit fully back to the farm level. If retailers reduced retail prices for avocados in 
response  to  the  CAC’s  promotion  programs,  the  effects  of  the  CAC’  promotions  would  be 
augmented  by  additional  increase  in  quantity  demanded  for  avocados  due  to  retailers’  price 
response. 
Table 7 presents the estimated effects of the CAC’s promotion programs on retail sales, 
retail price, and shipping price for avocados. The estimates of the promotion effects are obtained 
from the retail sales model, the retail pricing model, and the shipping price model, which all use 
weekly dummy variables as time-control variables. Therefore, the estimated promotion effects 
on retail sales are slightly different from those presented in section 10.4 from the retail sales 
model that uses yearly and monthly dummy variables.
9  However, the conclusions remain the 
same. The main purpose of using the weekly dummy variables is to analyze promotion effects on 
retail price, retail sales, and shipping price for avocados that are estimated from the models that 
apply  the  same  time  controls.  Applying  weekly  dummy  variables,  although  it  offers  better 
                                                 
9 The estimated promotion effect is 0.030, not statistically significant, from the within model by the short-panel data; 
the estimated promotion effect is 3.346, significant at the 1% statistical significance level, from the within model by 
the long-panel data. The results can be found in table 10.5.    40 
control over unobserved shocks, did not result in significant changes in estimates or different 
conclusions.  
The  CAC’s  promotion  programs  were  associated  with  higher,  but  not  statistically 
significant, retail sales estimated by the short-panel data, and with significantly higher retail sales 
estimated by the long-panel data. The separate estimates for radio and outdoor promotions from 
the short-panel data indicate that radio advertising was more effective than outdoor promotions 
in terms of generating retail sales per advertising dollar. The effect of outdoor promotions varied 
widely  relative  to  radio  advertising,  since  the  standard  error  of  the  estimate  of  outdoor 
promotions is more than twice as large as those of the estimates of overall promotions and radio 
advertising.  Nevertheless,  estimates  from  the  short-panel  data  show  that  neither  promotion 
program had a significant effect on retail sales.  
Next, the effects of the CAC’s promotions are calculated by the estimated promotional 
effects in unit/dollar by the short-panel data and the actual promotion expenditure in 2003 and 
2004. The promotional effects are calculated for each radio campaign during 2003 and 2004 by 
the estimated effect of radio advertising (0.033), and the annual average promotion effects are 
calculated for radio and outdoor promotions, and the overall promotion program in 2003 and 
2004 by the estimated effect of overall promotions (0.030). The effects of outdoor promotions 
are not calculated from the estimated coefficient of outdoor promotions, which is negative and 
statistically insignificant, and has considerably large standard error.  
Overall, there were 566 units and 621 units more avocados of each size sold at a retail 
account in a promotion market during a promotional week in 2003 and 2004, respectively. As the 
average weekly promotion expenditure on radio advertising was larger than the expenditure on 
outdoor  promotions,  the  effect  of  radio  advertising  was  1.73  times  as  large  as  the  effect  of   41 
outdoor promotions, given the estimated promotion effect per advertising dollar is the same for 
both radio and outdoor promotions. During a radio campaign, there were 612 units and 683 units 
more avocados of each size sold at a retail account in a promotion market during a promotion 
week in 2003 and 2004, respectively.  
The estimates from the long-panel data show that there were 3,438 units more avocados 
of each size sold at a retail account in a promotion market during a promotion week. The effect 
of radio advertising was twice as large as the effect of outdoor promotions. In particularly, there 
were  3,920  units  and  1,903  units  more  avocados  of  each  size  sold  at  a  retail  account  in  a 
promotion market during a week of radio advertising and outdoor promotion, respectively. The 
estimated promotion effects by the long-panel data are considerably larger than those by the 
short-panel data.  
The CAC’s promotion programs had positive, but not statistically significant effect on 
shipping prices. Shipping prices during promotion periods were 0.116 (0.068) cent/unit higher 
than shipping prices during non-promotion periods in promotion markets compared with non-
promotion  markets,  estimated  by  the  short-panel  (long-panel)  data.  The  results  indicate  that 
intertemporal  arbitrage  between  promotion  and  non-promotion  periods,  and  spatial  arbitrage 
between promotion and non-promotion markets were nearly efficient. Nevertheless, supply to 
promotion markets or during the promotion periods may not have adjusted perfectly, such that 
promotions generated slightly higher, but not statistically significant, shipping price in promotion 
market during promotion period. 
How  retailers  set  retail  prices  in  response  to  industry  advertising  programs  is  very 
important  to  the  effectiveness  of  promotion  programs.  Retail  prices  were  lower,  but  not 
statistically  significant,  than  retail  prices  in  non-promotional  periods  and  in  non-promotion   42 
markets, suggested by the estimates from the short-panel and the long-panel data. Retail prices 
were 0.384 cent/unit lower by the estimate from the short-panel data, and were 0.150 cent/unit 
lower by the estimate from the long-panel data.  There is no evidence that retailers capture some 
of the demand expansion induced by the CAC promotions through higher retail prices and some 
very weak evidence that they may contribute to the effectiveness of the programs by lowering 
price.  
As noted, retailers usually make ex-ante pricing decisions. Retailers, according to Lal and 
Matutues,  may  offer  price  discounts  in  response  to  an  anticipated  demand  shock.  Retailers, 
therefore, may reduce retail prices and margins in response to the demand shocks generated by 
the industry promotion programs only if they are well informed about the advertising campaigns, 
and they believe that the CAC’s promotions will effectively increase demand for avocados. A 
lack of response in retail pricing to the demand shocks generated by the CAC’s promotions does 
not  necessarily  suggest  that  retailers  behave  competitively.  It  might  be  caused  by  lack  of 
communication between the industry and retailers about the industry’s advertising campaigns 
and the effectiveness of the advertising programs. Therefore, the CAC’s promotion program 
could  possibly  be  enhanced  if  the  CAC  improves  communication  with  retailers  about  its 
advertising campaigns.  
8  Conclusions 
Retail prices for avocados exhibited countercyclical movements over seasonal demand shocks 
for avocados associated with some holidays and events. Demand for avocados is significantly 
high during some holidays and events, in particular during Super Bowl Sunday, Christmas/New 
Year, and Cinco de Mayo. However, retail prices and margins were significantly low during 
these holidays and events, which is a behavior that is not supported by perfect competition or   43 
standard oligopoly models. Retail prices varied differently from shipping prices during these 
holidays and event. Holidays and  events that are associated with high  demand for avocados 
generally had no significant effects or had positive effects on shipping prices.  
The empirical results support the prediction by Lal and Matutues (1994) that retailers 
offer  advertised  sales  for  a  product  during  its  demand  peaks  to  increase  consumers’  store 
patronage and profit from consumers’ whole shopping basket. The evidence does not support 
alternative  explanations  proposed  by  Bernheim  and  Whinston  (1990),  Warner  and  Barskey 
(1995), or Nevo and Hatzitaskos (2006). The conclusions reached by this study are consistent 
with the conclusions by Chevalier, Kashyap, and Rossi (2003) that is based on a very different 
type of retail data.  
How retailers adjust prices in response to demand shocks has important implications for 
an industry’s promotion program. The results show that the CAC’s promotions were associated 
with higher retail sales for avocados, but the evidence on significance of the promotion effects is 
mixed.  Promotion  effects  estimated  by  the  long-panel  data  were  greater  and  statistically 
significant  compared  with  the  estimate  by  the  short-panel  data  that  was  not  statistically 
significant.  This  may  be  because  variation  in  promotion  variable  is  not  sufficient  for 
identification in the estimation by the short-panel data, which only included two years, a period 
when promotion expenditure did not vary much.  
There was no indication that retailers capture some of the demand expansion induced by 
the CAC promotions through higher retail prices. There was some weak evidence that retailers 
may contribute to the effectiveness of the promotion programs by lowing prices, as retail prices 
were lower, but not statistically significant, than retail prices in non-promotional period and in 
non-promotion markets.    44 
In addition, the estimation results from the shipping price model suggest that grower-
shippers  were  able  to  arbitrage  efficiently  in  response  to  shocks  generated  by  the  CAC’s 
promotions. Since retail prices did not change significantly in response to the CAC’s promotions, 
demand increase should fully pass on to the farm gate, and the farm price increases as a result. In 
the event that retailers reduced retail prices for avocados in response to the CAC’s promotion 
programs, the effects of the CAC’ promotions would be augmented by additional increase in 
quantity demanded  for  avocados due to  retailers’ price response. This  study suggests  a new 
empirical  framework  of  promotion  evaluation  at  the  disaggregate  level  by  utilizing  natural 
experiment design, panel models, and econometric techniques that isolate unobserved factors 
that may contribute to changes in demand. 
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Table 1: Estimation Results for the Retail Pricing Model 
 
Dependent var.:    Short Panel      Long Panel   
Retail price      Within      FD      Within     FD 
(cents/unit)  Coeff.  s.e.  Coeff.  s.e.  Coeff.  s.e.  Coeff.  s.e. 
Retail price                 
      t −1  0.55
***  (0.02)  0.41
***  (0.04)  0.61
***  (0.02)  0.50
***  (0.03) 
      t −2  0.04
***  (0.02)  -0.02
***  (0.03)  0.09
***  (0.02)  0.04
***  (0.01) 
      t −3  0.11
***  (0.01)  0.06
***  (0.02)  0.09
***  (0.01)  0.06
***  (0.01) 
      t −4  0.04
***  (0.01)      0.03
***  (0.01)     
      t −5  0.01
***  (0.01)      0.02
***  (0.01)     
      t −6  0.04
***  (0.01)      0.04
***  (0.01)     
Shipping price                 
      t  0.07
***  (0.03)  0.06
***  (0.03)  0.03
***  (0.01)  0.01
***  (0.02) 
      t −1  0.12
***  (0.03)  0.16
***  (0.04)  0.06
***  (0.01)  0.06
***  (0.02) 
      t −2      0.03
***  (0.03)         
      t −3      0.10
***  (0.03)  -  -     
                 
Promotion ($1000)  -0.01
***  (0.02)  0.03
***  (0.01)  -0.02
***  (0.22)  0.35
***  (0.16) 
                 
Mexican Imports  -  -  -  -  -0.07
***  (0.04)  -0.01
***  (0.01) 
(1000,000 lbs.)                 
Christmas /N.Y.  -5.66
***  (1.09)  -4.20
***  (1.14)  -2.56
***  (0.59)  -2.50
***  (0.72) 
Super Bowl  -18.83
***  (2.21)  -25.86
***  (2.95)  -9.96
***  (1.25)  -13.51
***  (1.64) 
Valentine/President  0.00
***  (1.44)  -6.43
***  (2.25)  0.91
***  (0.65)  -2.06
***  (0.99) 
Cino de Mayo  -15.52
***  (1.91)  -14.10
***  (2.06)  -12.11
***  (1.31)  -11.47
***  (1.44) 
Easter  3.67
***  (0.96)  4.87
***  (1.59)  2.47
***  (0.63)  3.59
***  (1.01) 
Memorial Day  -1.16
***  (1.30)  -5.77
***  (1.78)  -1.41
***  (0.63)  -4.38
***  (1.08) 
July 4
th  5.44
***  (1.00)  1.01
***  (0.94)  0.61
***  (0.53)  0.11
***  (0.67) 
Labor Day  -3.48
***  (1.24)  -3.74
***  (1.55)  0.52
***  (0.62)  -0.69
***  (0.80) 
Thanksgiving  1.85
***  (1.13)  1.98
***  (1.37)  1.36
***  (0.62)  1.97
***  (0.91) 
                 
Jan.  6.33
***  (1.06)  3.35
***  (0.66)  6.00
***  (0.92)  2.77
***  (0.62) 
Feb.  5.22
***  (1.16)  7.35
***  (1.08)  3.01
***  (1.00)  3.98
***  (0.77) 
Mar.  3.56
***  (0.93)  0.86
***  (0.67)  3.73
***  (0.93)  1.08
***  (0.67) 
Apr.  1.56
***  (1.17)  -1.01
***  (0.87)  1.86
***  (1.09)  -1.15
***  (0.88) 
May  8.41
***  (1.49)  7.57
***   (1.15)  7.43
***  (1.17)  6.15
***  (0.87) 
Jun.  5.31
***  (1.21)  2.14
***  (0.72)  5.59
***  (1.10)  1.70
***  (0.75) 
Jul.  -0.60
***  (1.22)  -0.88
***  (0.78)  0.37
***  (1.07)  -0.65
***  (0.68) 
Aug.  -1.67
***  (1.24)  0.05
***  (0.74)  -1.86
***  (1.19)  -0.41
***  (0.60) 
Sep.  -0.90
***  (1.65)  3.89
***  (2.13)  0.28
***  (1.10)  0.99
***  (0.91) 
Nov.  2.22
***  (1.36)  2.06
***  (1.09)  -3.00
***  (1.19)  -1.09
***  (0.85) 
Dec.  1.81
***  (1.15)  0.79
***  (0.96)  0.17
***  (1.00)  -1.17
***  (0.64) 
Constant  -3.26
***  (0.88)  -1.04
***  (0.63)  1.02
***  (2.02)  1.54
***  (0.58) 
                 
Centered R
2  0.585
***    -    0.857
***    -   
# of obs.  14473
***    14077
***    39320
***    37723
***   
# of cluster  147
***    147
***    164
***    164
***   
Min. obs./cluster  6
***    2
***    59
***    22
***   
Max. obs./cluster  112
***    110
***    412
***    408
***   
Avg. obs./cluster  98.5
***    95.76
***    239.76
***    230.02
***   
# of IVs  43
***    46
***    114
***    115
***   
# of excl. IVs  0
***    4
***    0
***    6
***   
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Notes:  
 
1.  One, two, and three asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
2.  Standard errors are reported in the parentheses. Standard errors are cluster-robust, i.e., standard errors are robust 
to heteroskedasticty and arbitrary patterns of autocorrelation within individuals by clustering at the individual 
level. 
3.  The Hansen J test statistic and the C test statistic are cluster-robust. Various weak identification test statistics 
that are distributed as F or χ
2 are also cluster-robust.  
4.  Centered R
2 is not reported for the IV estimation. 
5.  The estimation results are for the models estimated by the short-panel or the long-panel data for large and small 
avocados. 
6.  Measurements of variables:  
￿  Retail price, shipping price, and retail margin are weekly and in cents/unit. 
￿  Retail sales are weekly and in 1000 units. 
￿  Import volumes of Chilean and Mexican avocados are monthly and in 1,000,000 pounds. 
￿  Shipment volume is weekly and in 1,000,000 units. 
￿  Promotion expenditure for the short-panel data is weekly and in $1000; the promotion variable for the 
long panel data is a dummy variable. 
7.  Year-monthly dummies are generated by year dummies, monthly dummies, and dummies of interacted terms by 
both. For models using year-monthly dummies, the estimates for year dummies and monthly dummies are 
reported, but the estimates for the interacted terms are not reported. 
8.  The within models are estimated by mean-differenced variables. Dummy variables are not differenced in the 
within models. Dummy variables, avocado imports, and promotion expenditure are not transformed by first 
differencing in the FD models.  
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Table 2: Estimation Results for the Retail Sales Model 
 
Dependent var.:    Short Panel Data      Long Panel Data   
Retail sales    Within      FD    Within    FD 
(1000 units)  Coeff.  s.e.  Coeff.  s.e.  Coeff.  s.e.  Coeff.  s.e. 
Price (cents/unit)                 
      t  -0.44
***  (0.12)  -0.45
***  (0.08)  -0.33
***  (0.06)  -0.38
***  (0.07) 
      t−1  0.11
***  (0.06)  0.06
***  (0.02)  0.06
***  (0.03)  0.04
***  (0.02) 
      t−2  0.13
***  (0.03)  0.05
***  (0.02)  0.07
***  (0.01)  0.05
***  (0.01) 
Elasticity at means                 
      t  -1.82
***    -1.83
***    -1.36
***    -1.58
***   
      t−1  0.50
***    0.25
***    0.27
***    0.16
***   
      t−2  0.51
***    0.21
***    0.28
***    0.21
***   
                 
Promotion ($1000)  0.02
***  (0.07)  -0.005
***  (0.02)  2.11
**  (1.18)  0.39
***  (0.24) 
                 
Christmas /N.Y.  7.06
***  (1.82)  3.29
***  (1.59)  5.01
***  (1.05)  2.73
***  (1.19) 
Super Bowl  17.59
***  (3.86)  13.42
***  (3.21)  8.18
***  (1.79)  12.33
***  (2.42) 
Valentine/President  0.73
***  (1.21)  4.77
***  (2.03)  -0.16
***  (0.63)  3.50
***  (1.47) 
Oscar Awards  1.29
***  (1.25)  2.71
***  (1.81)  0.15
***  (0.63)  0.57
***  (1.15) 
Cino de Mayo  4.52
***  (2.11)  5.82
***  (1.92)  5.49
***  (1.26)  10.46
***  (2.20) 
Easter  1.52
***  (1.40)  0.64
***  (1.29)  2.68
***  (1.14)  2.17
***  (1.08) 
Mother’s Day  -1.20
***  (1.50)  -2.73
***  (2.23)  -0.61
***  (0.93)  -5.89
***  (1.86) 
Memorial Day  2.70
***  (1.45)  2.71
***  (1.48)  2.86
***  (1.12)  5.16
***  (1.70) 
Father’s Day  -3.52
***  (3.24)  -0.59
***  (3.48)  -0.76
***  (0.56)  -0.02
***  (1.29) 
July 4
th  4.11
***  (1.35)  3.71
***  (1.07)  3.80
***  (1.09)  4.54
***  (1.27) 
Labor Day  5.19
***  (1.70)  6.86
***  (2.36)  2.21
***  (0.68)  3.94
***  (1.14) 
Thanksgiving  -1.51
***  (2.93)  -1.93
***  (1.20)  -0.93
***  (1.00)  0.12
***  (0.90) 
                 
Jan.  -1.53
***  (1.18)  -1.24
***  (0.79)   -4.19
***  (1.23)  -2.28
***  (0.62) 
Feb.  -1.60
***  (1.34)  -3.30
***  (1.11)   -2.81
***  (1.14)  -2.76
***  (0.86) 
Mar.  -0.64
***  (1.44)  -0.40
***  (0.60)  -1.71
***  (1.00)  -0.08
***  (0.57) 
Apr.  -0.29
***  (1.50)  -0.07
***  (0.60)  -1.29
***  (1.08)  -0.85
***  (0.51) 
May  3.68
***  (1.39)  -0.47
***  (1.07)  3.08
***  (1.08)  -1.25
***  (0.75) 
Jun.  7.74
***  (3.16)  0.39
***  (1.12)  3.67
***  (0.99)  -0.33
***  (0.49) 
Jul.  0.00
***  (1.41)  -0.78
***  (0.60)  2.77
***  (0.82)  -1.37
***  (0.46) 
Aug.  1.17
***  (1.50)  -0.68
***  (0.64)  1.36
***  (0.80)  -0.45
***  0.35) 
Sep.  4.34
***  (1.63)  -1.16
***  (0.76)  1.03
***  (0.57)  -0.76
***  (0.41) 
Nov.  1.57
***  (1.75)  0.78
***  (0.74)  -0.35
***  (0.71)  -0.40
***  (0.53) 
Dec.  -1.21
***  (1.75)  -0.25
***  (1.17)  -2.05
***  (0.94)  0.32
***  (0.76) 
Constant  -4.11
***  (1.35)  -0.33
***  (0.48)  -0.18
***  (1.99)  -0.53
***  (0.23) 
                 
# of obs.  13886
***    13886
***    37000
***    37000
***   
# of cluster  147
***    147
***    164
***    164
***   
Min obs./cluster  1
***    1
***    12
***    12
***   
Max obs./cluster  109
***    109
***    406
***    406
***   
Avg. obs./cluster  94.46
***    94.46
***    225.61
***    225.61
***   
# of IVs  46
***    36
***    45
***    44
***   
# of excl. IVs  17
***    6
***    10
***    9
***   
Notes: See notes at the end of table 1. The average retail price and sales are $1.3438/unit and 32898 units for the 
short panel data, and $1.3407/unit and 32189 units for the long panel data.   51 
Table 1: Estimation Results for the Shipping Price Model 
 
Dependent var.: 
Short panel, weight average shipping price 
for CA and imported avocados 
Long panel,  
shipping price for CA avocados 
Shipping price        Within        FD        Within       FD 
(cents/unit)  coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e.  coeff.  s.e. 
(1) weekly                 
Shipment volume  -6.35
***  (1.10)  -2.05
***  (0.59)  -0.30
***  (1.16)  -2.05
***  (0.87) 
(1,000,000 units)                 
Promotion ($1000)  0.01
***  (0.02)  -0.02
***  (0.01)  0.06
***  (0.39)  -0.08
***  (0.05) 
Mexican Imports  -0.46
***  (0.07)  -0.02
***  (0.01)  -0.17
***  (0.05)  -0.02
***  (0.02) 
(1,000,000 lbs.)                 
                 
(2) year-monthly                 
Shipment volume  -7.39
***  (1.22)  -3.05
***  (0.74)  -0.72
***  (1.20)  -2.95
***  (0.85) 
Promotion  0.01
***  (0.02)  -0.03
***  (0.01)  -0.04
***  (0.37)  -0.10
***  (0.05) 
Mexican Imports  -0.46
***  (0.07)  -0.07
***  (0.01)  -0.14
***  (0.04)  -0.02
***  (0.02) 
                 
From (2):                 
Christmas  3.15
***  (0.46)  0.88
***  (0.55)  -7.08
***  (0.54)  0.09
***  (0.67) 
      F1  2.81
***  (0.41)  2.57
***  (0.75)  -4.86
***  (0.51)  -1.52
***  (0.93) 
New Year  -2.65
***  (0.48)  0.29
***  (0.72)  -3.81
***  (0.38)  0.10
***  (0.46) 
Super Bowl  0.59
***  (0.37)  -3.74
***  (0.50)  0.28
***  (0.34)  -2.17
***  (0.35) 
      F1  0.50
***  (0.50)  -0.96
***  (0.88)  -0.10
***  (0.34)  -0.30
***  (0.37) 
Easter   -0.05
***  (0.30)  0.14
***  (0.34)  1.66
***  (0.19)  0.88
***  (0.25) 
      F1  0.22
***  (0.31)  -0.06
***  (0.44)  0.83
***  (0.18)  1.08
***  (0.26) 
Cino de Mayo  -1.39
****  (0.69)  -0.01
***  (0.87)  0.71
***  (0.23)  0.02
***  (0.29) 
      F1  1.65
***  (0.59)  1.79
***  (0.54)  2.01
***  (0.18)  0.74
***  (0.28) 
Memorial Day  5.69
***  (0.64)  0.43
***  (0.66)  1.10
***  (0.31)  1.66
***  (0.29) 
      F1  2.76
***  (0.52)  -0.76
***  (0.78)  -0.12
***  (0.16)  0.49
***  (0.28) 
July 4
th  2.35
***  (0.29)  -1.81
***  (0.44)  -1.08
***  (0.15)  -0.56
***  (0.16) 
      F1  -2.56
***  (0.56)  -4.80
***  (0.49)  -0.83
***  (0.26)  -2.11
***  (0.20) 
Labor Day  0.10
***  (0.54)  -3.11
***  (0.64)  0.05
***  (0.27)  0.86
***  (0.35) 
      F1  -1.27
***  (0.39)  0.41
***  (0.46)  1.70
***  (0.23)  1.05
***  (0.24) 
Thanksgiving  -2.31
***  (0.40)  3.17
***  (0.83)  -5.48
***  (0.82)  -1.81
***  (1.06) 
      F1  -6.01
***  (0.73)  4.10
***  (0.78)  -3.24
***  (0.70)  -0.49
***  (0.79) 
                 
Centered R
2  0.604
***    0.082
***    0.734
***    0.099
***   
# of obs.  8525
***    8454
***    23721
***    23687
***   
# of cluster  77
***    77
***    77
***    77
***   
Min obs./cluster  35
***    34
***    52
***    52
***   
Max obs./cluster  117
***    116
***    417
***    416
***   
Avg. obs./cluster  110.75
***    109.79
***    308.06
***    307.51
***   
Note: See notes at the end of table 1.   52 
Table 4: Seasonal Effects of Retail Sales 
 
Dependent var.:    Within       FD   
Retail sales      Short Panel     Long Panel      Short Panel     Long Panel 
(1,000 units)  Estimate  s.e.  Estimate  s.e.  Estimate  s.e.  Estimate  s.e. 
                 
Christmas /New Year  7.06
***  (1.82)  5.01
***  (1.05)  3.29
***  (1.59)  2.73
***  (1.19) 
Super Bowl Sunday  17.59
***  (3.86)  8.18
***  (1.79)  13.42
***  (3.21)  12.33
***  (2.42) 
Valentine/President Day  0.73
***  (1.21)  -0.16
***  (0.63)  4.77
***  (2.03)  3.50
***  (1.47) 
Academy Awards  1.29
***  (1.25)  0.15
***  (0.63)  2.71
***  (1.81)  0.57
***  (1.15) 
Cincode Mayo  4.52
***  (2.11)  5.49
***  (1.26)  5.82
***  (1.92)  10.46
***  (2.20) 
Easter  1.52
***  (1.40)  2.68
***  (1.14)  0.64
***  (1.29)  2.17
***  (1.08) 
Mother’s Day  -1.20
***  (1.50)  -0.61
***  (0.93)  -2.73
***  (2.23)  -5.89
***  (1.86) 
Memorial Day  2.70
***  (1.45)  2.86
***  (1.12)  2.71
***  (1.48)  5.16
***  (1.70) 
Father’s Day  -3.52
***  (3.24)  -0.76
***  (0.56)  -0.59
***  (3.48)  -0.02
***  (1.29) 
July 4
th  4.11
***  (1.35)  3.80
***  (1.09)  3.71
***  (1.07)  4.54
***  (1.27) 
Labor Day  5.19
***  (1.70)  2.21
***  (0.68)  6.86
***  (2.36)  3.94
***  (1.14) 
Thanksgiving  -1.51
***  (2.93)  -0.93
***  (1.00)  -1.93
***  (1.20)  0.12
***  (0.90) 
                 
Christmas /New Year                 
      Large avocados  3.11
***  (2.27)  4.35
***  (1.13)         
      Small avocados  10.81
***  (3.35)  5.74
***  (1.71)         
      H0: Large = Small                 
            F(1, #)  F(1,146) = 2.99  F(1,163) = 0.51         
            Prob.    0.09     0.48         
                 
Super Bowl Sunday                 
      Large avocados  16.98
***  (5.96)  7.41
***  (2.55)         
      Small avocados  17.92
***  (5.70)  8.96
***  (2.59)         
      H0: Large = Small                 
            F(1, #)  F(1,146) = 0.01  F(1,163) = 0.18         
            Prob.    0.92     0.67         
                 
Cinco de Mayo                 
      Large avocados  7.31
***  (3.08)  5.21
***  (2.40)         
      Small avocados  1.69
***  (3.02)  5.78
***  (1.96)         
      H0: Large = Small                 
            F(1, #)  F(1,146) = 1.67  F(1,163) = 0.03         
            Prob.    0.20     0.87         
                 
Jan.  -1.53
***  (1.18)  -4.19
***  (1.23)         
Feb.  -1.60
***  (1.34)  -2.81
***  (1.14)         
Mar.  -0.64
***  (1.44)  -1.71
***  (1.00)         
Apr.  -0.29
***  (1.50)  -1.29
***  (1.08)         
May  3.68
***  (1.39)  3.08
***  (1.08)         
Jun.  7.74
***  (3.16)  3.67
***  (0.99)         
Jul.  0.00
***  (1.41)  2.77
***  (0.82)         
Aug.  1.17
***  (1.50)  1.36
***  (0.80)         
Sep.  4.34
***  (1.63)  1.03
***  (0.57)         
Nov.  1.57
***  (1.75)  -0.35
***  (0.71)         
Dec.  -1.21
***  (1.75)  -2.05
**  (0.94)         
Note: See notes at the end of table 1. 
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Table 5: Seasonal Effects of Retail Price 
 
Dependent var.:    Within       FD   
Retail price      Short Panel     Long Panel      Short Panel     Long Panel 
(cents/unit)  Estimate  s.e.  Estimate  s.e.  Estimate  s.e.  Estimate  s.e. 
                 
Christmas /New Year  -5.66
***  (1.09)  -2.56
***  (0.59)  -4.20
***  (1.14)  -2.50
***  (0.72) 
Super Bowl Sunday  -18.83
***  (2.21)  -9.96
***  (1.25)  -25.86
***  (2.95)  -13.51
***  (1.64) 
Valentine/President Day  0.00
***  (1.44)  0.91
***  (0.65)  -6.43
***  (2.25)  -2.06
***  (0.99) 
Cincode Mayo  -15.52
***  (1.91)  -12.11
***  (1.31)  -14.10
***  (2.06)  -11.47
***  (1.44) 
Easter  3.67
***  (0.96)  2.47
***  (0.63)  4.87
***  (1.59)  3.59
***  (1.01) 
Memorial Day  -1.16
***  (1.30)  -1.41
***  (0.63)  -5.77
***  (1.78)  -4.38
***  (1.08) 
July 4
th  5.44
***  (1.00)  0.61
***  (0.53)  1.01
***  (0.94)  0.11
***  (0.67) 
Labor Day  -3.48
***  (1.24)  0.52
***  (0.62)  -3.74
***  (1.55)  -0.69
***  (0.80) 
Thanksgiving  1.85
***  (1.13)  1.36
***  (0.62)  1.98
***  (1.37)  1.97
***  (0.91) 
                 
Christmas /New Year                 
      Large avocados  -6.50
***  (1.49)  -2.75
***  (0.79)         
      Small avocados  -4.83
***  (1.12)  -2.38
***  (0.70)         
      H0: Large = Small                 
            F(1, #)  F(1,146) = 1.25  F(1,163) = 0.17         
            Prob.    0.27    0.68         
                 
Super Bowl Sunday                 
      Large avocados  -20.03
***  (3.22)  -11.52
***  (1.82)         
      Small avocados  -17.61
***  (2.82)  -8.55
***  (1.45)         
      H0: Large = Small                 
            F(1, #)  F(1,146) = 0.34  F(1,163) = 1.93         
            Prob.    0.56    0.17         
                 
Cincode Mayo                 
      Large avocados  -17.25
***  (2.33)  -13.25
***  (1.81)         
      Small avocados  -13.90
***  (2.23)  -11.10
***  (1.49)         
      H0: Large =  Small                 
            F(1, #)  F(1,146) = 1.77  F(1,163) = 1.14         
            Prob.    0.19    0.29         
                 
Jan.  6.33
***  (1.06)  6.00
***  (0.92)         
Feb.  5.22
***  (1.16)  3.01
***  (1.00)         
Mar.  3.56
***  (0.93)  3.73
***  (0.93)         
Apr.  1.56
***  (1.17)  1.86
**  (1.09)         
May  8.41
***  (1.49)  7.43
***  (1.17)         
Jun.  5.31
***  (1.21)  5.59
***  (1.10)         
Jul.  -0.60
***  (1.22)  0.37
***  (1.07)         
Aug.  -1.67
***  (1.24)  -1.86
***  (1.19)         
Sep.  -0.90
***  (1.65)  0.28
***  (1.10)         
Nov.  2.22
***  (1.36)  -3.00
***  (1.19)         
Dec.  1.81
***  (1.15)  0.17
***  (1.00)         
Note: See notes at the end of table 1. 
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Table 6: Seasonal Effects of Shipping Price 
 
Dependent var.:    Within       FD   
Shipping price 
Short Panel 






CA & imported 
avocados 
   Long Panel 
 
CA avocados 
(cents/unit)  Estimate  s.e.  Estimate  s.e.  Estimate  s.e.  Estimate  s.e. 
                 
Christmas  3.15
***  (0.46)  -7.08
***  (0.54)  0.88
***  (0.55)  0.09
***  (0.67) 
      F1  2.81
***  (0.41)  -4.86
***  (0.51)  2.57
***  (0.75)  -1.52
***  (0.93) 
                 
New Year  -2.65
***  (0.48)  -3.81
***  (0.38)  0.29
***  (0.72)  0.10
***  (0.46) 
                 
Super Bowl Sunday  0.59
***  (0.37)  0.28
***  (0.34)  -3.74
***  (0.50)  -2.17
***  (0.35) 
      F1  0.50
***  (0.50)  -0.10
***  (0.34)  -0.96
***  (0.88)  -0.30
***  (0.37) 
                 
Easter   -0.05
***  (0.30)  1.66
***  (0.19)  0.14
***  (0.34)  0.88
***  (0.25) 
      F1  0.22
***  (0.31)  0.83
***  (0.18)  -0.06
***  (0.44)  1.08
***  (0.26) 
                 
Cincode Mayo  -1.39
***  (0.69)  0.71
***  (0.23)  -0.01
***  (0.87)  0.02
***  (0.29) 
      F1  1.65
***  (0.59)  2.01
***  (0.18)  1.79
***  (0.54)  0.74
***  (0.28) 
                 
Memorial Day  5.69
***  (0.64)  1.10
***  (0.31)  0.43
***  (0.66)  1.66
***  (0.29) 
      F1  2.76
***  (0.52)  -0.12
***  (0.16)  -0.76
***  (0.78)  0.49
***  (0.28) 
                 
July 4
th  2.35
***  (0.29)  -1.08
***  (0.15)  -1.81
***  (0.44)  -0.56
***  (0.16) 
      F1  -2.56
***  (0.56)  -0.83
***  (0.26)  -4.80
***  (0.49)  -2.11
***  (0.20) 
                 
Labor Day  0.10
***  (0.54)  0.05
***  (0.27)  -3.11
***  (0.64)  0.86
***  (0.35) 
      F1  -1.27
***  (0.39)  1.70
***  (0.23)  0.41
***  (0.46)  1.05
***  (0.24) 
                 
Thanksgiving  -2.31
***  (0.40)  -5.48
***  (0.82)  3.17
***  (0.83)  -1.81
***  (1.06) 
      F1  -6.01
***  (0.73)  -3.24
***  (0.70)  4.10
***  (0.78)  -0.49
***  (0.79) 
                 
Jan.  10.33
***  (0.98)  4.48
***  (0.93)         
Feb.  7.23
***  (0.92)  3.75
***  (0.97)         
Mar.  12.07
***  (0.98)  6.50
***  (1.07)         
Apr.  9.42
***  (0.98)  2.76
***  (1.16)         
May  8.46
***  (0.94)  3.44
***  (0.92)         
Jun.  11.15
***  (0.87)  3.53
***  (0.91)         
Jul.  3.28
***  (1.16)  -2.97
***  (1.39)         
Aug.  9.92
***  (0.79)  -9.83
***  (1.46)         
Sep.  -3.86
***  (0.60)  -7.90
***  (0.87)         
Nov.  -6.38
***  (0.86)  -26.75
***  (1.75)         
Dec.  -14.63
***  (0.70)  -33.02
***  (1.58)         
Note: See notes at the end of table 1. 
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Table 7: The Effect of the CAC’s Promotions on Retail Sales, Retail Price, and Shipping Price 
 









  Estimate  s.e.  Estimate  s.e.  Estimate  s.e. 
Short panel             
      Promotion (pooled)  0.030
***    0.071      -0.019    0.020     0.006    0.024     
             
      Radio  0.033
***  0.077  -0.019  0.021  0.028  0.018 
      Outdoor  -0.061
***  0.187  -0.023  0.079  0.083  0.062 
             
Long panel             
      Promotion (pooled)  3.438
***    1.386      -0.150  0.229     0.068     0.564     
             
      Radio  3.920
***  2.265  0.042  0.411  0.136  0.350 
      Outdoor  1.903
***  1.387  -0.245  0.311  0.087  0.442 
 










  2003  2004  2003  2004  2003  2004 
Radio             
      Radio 1  0.652  0.698  -0.369  -0.396  0.553  0.592 
      Radio 2  0.699  0.710  -0.396  -0.402  0.593  0.602 
      Radio 3  0.673  0.683  -0.382  -0.387  0.571  0.579 
      Radio 4  0.423  0.642  -0.240  -0.364  0.359  0.545 
Average  0.612  0.683  -0.347  -0.387  0.519  0.580 
             
Average             
      Radio  0.422  0.464  -0.275  -0.303  0.147  0.161 
      Outdoor  0.244  0.255  -0.159  -0.167  0.085  0.089 
      Promotion  0.556  0.621  -0.363  -0.405  0.116  0.130 
 